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SUMMARY 
Who or what defines the sovereign ruler and it's political subject? Within legal and political 
framework of the modern world, questions about sovereignty and power always remain open. 
Human life is conditioned by the sovereignty of the state he resides in, and that, in turn, 
conditions the concept of the political which defines a person as a citizen, as well as his status, 
and political actions. The aim of this research is to compare two concepts of the political in 
the sphere of a man's position and role as a legal – political subject in modern philosophy of 
politics and law. The paper compares two distinguished political theorists, who have made 
their most relevant contributions to political philosophy during the time of Weimar Republic 
between two World Wars, as well as during the immediate post – war period during the 1950s 
of the 20th century. This paper interprets and compares the perspective of Hannah Arendt, a 
theorist whose entire legal – political thought is based on the idea of a human being that is 
conditioned to live among others, with capability of autonomous action, which is the basis of 
every political action. As such, human being is unavoidably a plural being. Also, the paper 
explores the view of a controversial German legal philosopher Carl Schmitt, whose concept 
of the political is based on the value  of state above the  individual, and the eternal legitimacy 
of the concept of the political is the human capability for making the friend/enemy criteria. 
The aim of the paper is not to discuss which framework is more or less ethically "justifiable", 
pro – social or humanitarian, the aim is to show their implications on the human being itself, 
as an authentic political subject. Implications concern political and human rights, as well as 
physical existence. The similarities, as well as differences in the philosophical views of the 
above mentioned philosophers are explored, and especially vital is their opposite view of the 
nature of conflict among human beings, for it is the possibility of conflict that leads to 
different consequences (political and physical) on human beings in their philosophies. 
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Verum est, summus hominorum. 
(Truth is, we are only human.) 
1. Introductory thoughts and parallel biographies 
 
Writing a research paper on the problems of a man as a legal – political subject from the 
philosophical perspective is a challenge, especially today. Too many times one can hear 
cynical and populist critics in public media, who say how writing and discussing a human 
being as a legal – political subject today does not make a lot of sense, because (as always) all 
governments are equally rotten, all citizens everywhere in the world are equally unfree and 
repressed, and the only adequate political and constitutional solution for all problems is some 
form of benevolent dictatorship in which "everyone will know their place" and "one would 
not need to think too much, he would just need follow his orders properly". Regardless of 
wether or not we agree with the above stated opinions, one can agree that the 21st century 
brought along an intensified activity in political and legal sphere, and not necessarily in 
pacifist or integrative terms. By the intensified activity I refer to the world's financial crisis 
and recession from the year 2008, fierce parliamentary disagreements and protests within 
European Union, revolutions and armed combat in several Middle – Eastern countries – most 
of all Syria, where the emergency state is still present – as well as the epilogue of the 
American military intervention in Afghanistan. In the context of alleviating wartime traumas 
in the Balkans, one should not forget the latest trials of Haague ICTY Tribunal, which add 
new factors in the discussion about a human being as a legal – political subject, at least in the 
context of distinguishing military, administrative and civilian factor.
1
 Happenings in the 
political and legal sphere, even the happenings that could be interpreted as a positive progress, 
are usually completely opposite in character from what a spectator would call "benevolent", 
"harmless", or "peaceful". The nature of political happenings and legal integrations rests on 
discord, disagreement and conflict, while pessimist might even say chaos. Modern democratic 
state is always, within reasonable limits, a conflicted and pluralistic society, in which many 
conflicts of interests and opinions are possible. Also, in the field of state and international law 
there are always new exceptional situations arising, that demand new forms of political 
solutions. Theoretical framework that this paper examines dates from the first half  of the 
                                                 
1
 For more on this important distinctive factor of contemporary law see John Rawls, in his book The Law of 
Peoples, p. 111, KruZak, Zagreb, 2004. 
5 
previous century, specifically from the time of Weimar Republic
2
 and post – WWII period, 
where this framework was well – received in post – war West Germany and United States of 
America. That is, one of the frameworks was well – received, for we are talking about two 
seperate theoretical constructs about the nature of political, and about the nature of a human 
being as a political subject. The first theoretical framework belongs to Jewish political theorist 
Hannah Arendt, who emigrated from Germany in 1941 to the USA, where her political theory 
and anthropology found massive audience and great success. The other theoretical framework 
belongs to Carl Schmitt, German jurist and political philosopher, in who there is a renewed 
interest today, and who is the subject of many discussions, mainly because of sympathizing 
and collaboration during the criminal National Socialist regime in Germany. Thoughts of all 
philosophers and theorists are deeply linked to life and the surrounding world, and theoretic 
implications of philosophy find their best use in practice. Precisely because of it, the 
following part of the paper will examine the spirit of time from which Hannah Arendt and 
Carl Schmitt came from. If we want to comprehend the deepest and most far – reaching 
philosophical implications of their theories, research should start from the time and 
circumstances in which their theories were made, as well as life and actions of the 
philosophers. Every theory has a practice, and every practice has a theory – especially when it 
comes to political and legal theory, who always have implications on the life of political 
subjects, and deal with human beings in a specific way. Because of that, historical background 
is essential. It should be noted that in this case, a common historical background is there, and 
it includes First World War, turbulent era of the Weimar Republic, Second World War and 
the Holocaust, as well as the post – war period of rebuilding, during the fifties and the sixties.  
 
Hannah Arendt was born in the year 1906, in today's city of Hannover, in secular Jewish 
family. Her political thought is rooted in the phenomenological tradition of Edmund Husserl 
and Martin Heidegger, which she read during her studies at Marburg and Heidelberg 
universities in Germany. It should be noted that she was partly influenced by her Jewish 
heritage, and the fact that she was a part of a Jewish minority in Germany, regardless of being 
assimilated in German culture. According to her own words, one of the earliest philosophical 
influences on her worldview were the works of German Enlightenment philosopher, 
                                                 
2
 Weimar Republic (1919 – 1933) – a state made on German territory, after the First World War, as a federative 
republic with a coalition government assembled from social democrat, democrat and Catholic parties. It has 
ceased to exist with the establishment of the Third Reich. 
6 
Immanuel Kant.
3
 By coming to America during the Holocaust, Arendt had become a 
naturalized American citizen, and in the same time, a guest lecturer at numerous prestigious 
American universities, including Berkeley, Northwestern and Princeton – where she was the 
first woman to teach a class ever. She kept a correspondence with many intellectual and 
political figures of Europe and America, including Mary McCarthy, Karl Jaspers and 
Gershom Scholem. Through her entire life, she had remained a proponent of an authentic 
political pluralism, as well as a sharp critic of American foreign policy in Vietnam.  
 
The fate of other intellectual protagonist, Carl Schmitt, is drastically opposite. Schmitt was 
born in Plettenberg, in the year 1888, in a Catholic family of a middle – class official. 
Schmitt's intellectual development has a similar background as Arendt's, as it is typical for 
Germany prior and in between two World Wars. As Schmitt himself states in one of his 
sketches from the year 1958, formative influcences on him were as follows: "...specific 
Catholic background of his birthplace, clericalism of Catholic school in Attendorn which he 
attended as a boy, liberal education received during high school, post – Hegelian Prussian 
spirit and Neo - Kantianism that marked Wilhelmine Germany before First World War, 
German nationalism as a reaction to defeat and humiliation in First World War, but also the 
feeling of "true pluralism and great liberty" that the change of regime and first years of 
Weimar Republic had brought."
4
 Schmitt joined the army service as a volunteer in 1916, 
although he did not spend war at the battlefront, but in an infantry unit in Munich. From 
numerous dedications to fallen comrades in his texts it is obvious how much the First World 
War had influenced young Schmitt. In the year 1921, Schmitt had become a university 
professor in many prestigious German universities, in Griefswald and Bonn, then Cologne, 
and finally, University of Friedrich Wilhelm (today's Humboldt University) in Berlin, where 
he had remained until the end of National Socialist regime. What followed was common to 
many German intellectuals of the time, and that is collaboration with National Socialist 
regime, to which he went over after the takeover in 1930. During the early period of Hitler's 
reign he had become a chief editor of German Jurist Paper (Deutsche Juristen – Zeitung), and 
during that period some of his morally most questionable texts were produced – i. e. trying to 
                                                 
3
 As stated in the Serbian translation of her interview, published as Zatočenici zla: zaveštanje Hane Arent, 
Beogradski Krug, 2002. 
4
 As stated in the Croatian translation of Carl Schmitt and his writings, published as Politički spisi, p 180, from 
the afterword by Nenad Zakošek 
7 
justify the murder of the commander of SA
5
 squad, an event Schmitt called the protection of 
the rule of law.
6
 However, Schmitt was later denounced in the reports of SS
7
 as an opportunist, 
and he lost most of his functions. After the war he was interrogated at Nuremberg process, 
although he was not charged. Unlike most of his intellectual contemporaries (including the 
notable philosopher Martin Heidegger) he had refused denazification, consequentially lost his 
cathedra, and found himself banned for life from teaching in Germany. After that, he returned 
to his birthtown of Plettenberg, where he has remained in a semi – isolation for the rest of his 
life, save for occasional lectures in Franco's Spain (where his later work, Theory of the 
Partisan was made). 
 
The reader will notice how different the life paths of these authors are, during the decades that 
brought along new political forms, new forms of dictatorship, but new forms of freedom and 
action as well. Occasionally one can hear that every philosophical and scientific mind is a 
"product of it's own time", and that the time in which a person lives in necessarily and 
unavoidably determines the character and ideas of a philosopher. In other words, this belief 
tells us that if a person is born in a specific ime, within a specific social group, in a specific 
country, this person will have the same beliefs and ideas as all of his contemporaries. The 
author of this scientific paper can not agree with that, and this paper aims to show otherwise, 
and considers that the lives and theories of the two philosophers in question say otherwise. 
Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt, when constructing their framworks, use anthropology as a a 
starting point, that is, from understanding of a human being as a genuine political being, who 
is able to create authentic political communities (something that Schmitt stresses) and 
political action (something on which Arendt puts more emphasis). For such things, only a 
human being is capable, and in turn, they make him an authentic political subject. However, 
their thinking of human being as a political subject is different, especially when we look at 
their concepts of political, the importance of an individual, and the meaning of conflict in the 
political sphere, which is something that influences man above everything else as a legal and 
                                                 
5
 SA – (ger.) Sturmabteilung or Assault Division, a German paramilitary organization, whose first commander 
Ernst Röhm was killed in 1934, after which German generals followed Hitler. 
6
 Carl Schmitt, Politički spisi, p 183, Politička Kultura, Zagreb, 2007. (from the afterword by Nenad Zakošek) 
7
 SS – (ger.) Schutzstaffel or Protection Squadron, one of the main Nazi organizations, whose last commander 
was the notorious Heinrich Himmler. 
8 
political subject – that he can be captured, tortured, killed, as well as lose his citizenship status, 
be it permanently or temporarily.
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 For more on the topic, see Serbian translation of Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Feministička 
izdavačka kuća, Beograd, 1998. and Croatian translation Agamben's work Homo Sacer, Zagreb, Multimedijalni 
institut, Arkzin, 2006. 
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2. Political Community and the Political Subject 
 
 
If we aim to comprehend what relation is towards political subjects in the philosophies of 
Schmitt and Arendt, we must first see which political community/form represents the ideal for 
Schmitt, and which for Arendt. It is important to know how do these authors perceive the 
concept of state itself, as well as which political communities and forms of government do 
they believe to be valuable for analysis. Schmitt begins his important essay, The Concept of 
the Political (ger. Der Begriff des Politischen) by a perfectly concise, and yet esoteric and 
somewhat vague statement – "The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the 
political."
9
 Schmitt defines a state as a "specific political status of an organized people, and in 
a determinary sense, a crucial state, against many imaginable individual and collective 
statuses..."
10
 In his essay, he warns how the term political is always used as a counterpoint to 
something, i. e. morals, religion, law, economy, etc. The conclusion is clear – at this time, 
there is no satisfactory and comprehensive definition of the political. Political may be thought 
equal to the category of state, that is, to think in equal terms about the concept of the state and 
the concept of the political, however Schmitt does not find that this is true, at least not during 
the time of Weimar Republic. It is worth mentioning how Schmitt, in the foreword to the 
second edition of the essay The Concept of the Political says how once, there was a time 
when it made sense for categories of state and political to be considered as equal. In a 
romantic and very static
11
 tone, Schmitt also states the following: "European part of 
humankind was, until recently, living in the time whose legal terminology was completely 
determined from the viewpoint of state and they presumed state as a political unity. Period of 
statehood is now finished. This does not need further explanation. (...) State as the model of 
political unity, state as a bearer of the most intriguing of all monopolies, the monopoly of the 
political decision, this product of European form and occidental rationalism is now dethroned. 
But his concepts remain..."
12
 
 
For Schmitt, the designation, and to an extent, justificiation of the concept of the political, as 
an authentic human function is in determining specifically political categories. These 
categories, or concepts, are friend and enemy. Having in mind the suggestive character of 
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 Carl Schmitt, Pojam političkoga, p 67, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2007  
10
 Carl Schmitt, op. cit., p 67 
11
 Statism (from French, etat = state), theory based on a need for larger scale of participation of state in domestic 
affairs, economic affairs and matters, as well as other areas of social life (political, cultural, educational, etc.) 
12
 Carl Schmitt, op. cit., p 62 
10 
these conepts, Schmitt does not see the political enimity in terms of good and evil, just or 
unjust, or a similar concept – for Schmitt, political enemy is simply the Other, a foreigner, 
with who (in extreme cases) conflicts are possible, which can not be resolved through norms 
and normative law. Due to that, Schmitt through his entire scientific and academic work 
speaks in favor of a decisionism
13
 in law, something that is constrasted to a "pure" normative 
law, which was propagated by many legal philosophers of Weimar Republic. On the other 
hand, Arendt says how the main justification and condition of the concept of political is in 
human action – by this, action is perceived differently than work and manufacturing in 
Arendt's political anthropology. Arendt believes that action is the only activity that can occur 
directly between human beings, without any mediation of things or material, that are usually 
necessary for work and manufacture. According to Arendt, action reponds to the fundamental 
condition of pluralism, and that is the fact that people, and not man (taken as a singular and an 
individual) inhabit the world. Accoring to that, pluralism is possible only in the multiplicity
14
, 
and togetherness of the people – which unavoidably leads to political communities. Even 
more precise definition by Adrendt is the one that says how authentic action is the unity of 
speech and thought, something that was, as Arendt believes, specific to Greek polis.
15
 Basis 
for this exists, especially when taking into consideration the different perception of freedom 
in antic Greece – the type of freedom that was not "negative freedom", but more of a positive 
freedom, completely tied to action in public life, that is, the political life. It should be noted 
how Arendt also operates with a fairly romanticized notion of polis and the Greek perception 
of freedom – which is obvious from her major anthropological work Vita Activa: "To belong 
to a few equals (homoioi) meant to be able to live among equals; but the public arena itself, 
was rife with a fierce competitive spirit, where everyone needed to be distinguished from 
others, how he would by unique actions and accomplishments show how he is the best (aien 
aristeuein). (...) And because of this possibility and out of love for state that has made this 
possible for everyone, everyone was more or less willing to share the burdens of judicial work, 
defense, and public affairs."
16
 Arendt ignores the non – existant negative freedom/"freedom 
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 Decisionism (the word is derived from German and the expression Dezisionismus) is a political, ethical and 
legal doctrine which claims that the legitimacy of law is not based on what this law states, rather, is the law 
created through proper method from the appropriate and sovereign authority. 
14
 It should be noted that the concepts of "multiplicity" and "pluralism" are to viewed strictly separate from the 
concepts of masses. 
15
 Polis/πολις – a concept that stands for a specific historical and political form of the city – state, typical for 
ancient Greece. Philosophically, historically and politically, this concept should be sperated from the concepts of 
"modern nation state" of today. A modern state is defined primarily by the distinction of state and society, as 
well as the concept of nation. From Aristotle's Critique of Democracy, Željko Senković, Faculty of Philosophy, 
Osijek. 
16
 Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa, p 38, August Cesarec, Zagreb, 1991 
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from" within polis, as well as a great number of slaves (people unable to act and unfree), and 
also – a large influence of polis on the life and death of every individual, be it a free citizen, 
or a slave. However, Arendt is right when she perceives action as an authentic basic principle 
of political action, and political subjectivization of a person in general. 
To conclude, if the ideal political community for Arendt is a Greek polis, then such an ideal 
for Schmitt is a classical European Renaissance state, with a clear source of sovereignty and 
equally clearly defined relation of friendship and enmity towards other sovereign states – such 
relation is, in Schmitt's work, called a high point of politics. In the given example, Schmitt is 
susceptible to a dose of political romanticism, a romanticism that sees salvation only in 
solitary and anti – federalist concepts of statehood, where states could practice politics "as 
they please", regardless of how warlike, isolationist or even genocidal in character the state 
politics are. Schmitt's assumption (which is a fairly typical conservative political rhetoric of 
today) is that if the independant state sovereignty is respected, along with zero tolerance for 
any kind of interventionism, no matter if the interventionism is of humanitarian, military or 
political type, interstate politics are just as the way they should be, and it already gives a 
supposed guarantee that everything is going to be "alright". When he defines the state as a 
political status, Schmitt says how the state is "a specific kind of status of an organized 
people."
17
 This definition is also imprecise and vague, for a priori it excludes any kind of 
possibility of co – habitation of two or more people in one state – examples of this include 
Czhekoslovakia or South Africa. 
 
The terms of pluralism and pluriverse are not completely foreign to Schmitt. In his essay The 
Concept of the Political he states how from the conceptual attributes of the political follows 
the pluralism of the world of states. Equally, as Hannah Arendt sees human beings as starting 
points (her starting points are the human beings themselves), Schmitt perceives the states as 
political starting points, which is examplified by the passage: "As long as a state exists, there 
will thus always be in the world more than just one state. A world state which embraces the 
entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist. The political world is a pluriverse, not a 
universe. In this sense every theory of state is pluralistic..."
18
 The forementioned passage 
corresponds to the above mentioned political – anthropological thoughts of Hannah Arendt, 
when she speaks of conditions of human life on Earth – "...that people, not man in singular, 
live on earth and inhabit the world." From that it can be inferred that the understanding of 
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 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2007., p 67 
18
 Carl Schmitt, op. cit., p 86 
12 
legal – political subject for Arendt is based on an individual who is always destined to 
unavoidably live with Others, while Schmitt's understaning of legal – political subject is 
necessarily tied to the concept of state, and moreover, it seems that from Schmitt's point of 
view, a legal – political subject that does not belong to a state (in legal terminology, does not 
possess a citizenship) is not possible. Schmitt's theory of non – existence of political without 
the factor of state is not pointless, for Hannah Arendt also speaks in her Origins of 
Totalitarianism how one of the greatest dangers for a person in the political world is the loss 
of citizenship, examplified by the traumas of Jews and apatrides/stateless persons during the 
Holocaust. Arendt states how the situation of Jewish people is highly symptomatic, for Jews 
have always enjoyed a status of a "stateless people".
19
 Still, in the opus of Hannah Arendt, 
state itself is not a guarantee of a legal (nor moral) person in a human being. In the Origins of 
Totalitarianism, Arendt explains how one of the main goals of totalitarianism is, besides 
constructing a new form of reality, the elimination of a legal and moral person
20
 inside a 
human being. Arendt believes how any kind of authentic and functioning legal system would 
eliminate the essence of totalitarianism itself – an example for manifestation of this essece is 
the concentration camp.
21
 In this frightening new biopolitical space it is possible to eliminate 
all civil and human rights, and all sorts of legal protection of the individual. Arendt also 
arguments how it is more difficult to destroy a legal person of a criminal, a person who has 
done a crime, than that of an innocent citizen – a legal subject who has not done anything, 
who has lost his very right to existence. These considerations lead to perception of human and 
civil rights in the works of Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt, and their perception of this is 
very much alike, and there will be more arguments on this later. 
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 The situation has changed in 1948, with the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel, in the Middle East. 
20
 As a philosophical concept, this word was pioneered by Immanuel Kant. The term person, in a legal and a 
political sense, is quite different from the concept of man. 
21
 A key concept within the history and political theory of the 20
th
 century. It is, above all, a prison camp for 
political prisoners, members of various undesirable ethnic and/or religious groups, and, in more rare occasions, 
civilians from a critical area of military combat. The word concentration camp (ger. Konzentrationslager) is 
unavoidably etymologically and politically tied to Third Reich and Germany. However, it should be noted that 
the function of a concentration camp was not used in the Third Reich for the first time. The first use of such 
camps was during the Boer Wars (1899 – 1902) in South Africa. At that time, the British army used them for the 
isolation of Boer civilian population, and cutting off all supplies and help to the Boer army from the civilians. 
Boer camps were not aimed at destruction and physical extermination such as the camps of totalitarian Third 
Reich, as it's sole purpose was isolation. Naturally, every concentration camp includes extremely low quality of 
life and living conditions, the presence of various diseases, and the inevitable neglect. Also, in the English 
language, one should distinguish between the concepts of internment camp and concentration camp. The latter is 
considered to be much more problematic in nature, due to incomparably lower quality of life and living 
conditions. 
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3. Sovereignty and Political Subjects 
 
Schmitt's essay The Concept of Political can be taken as a central point for examining the 
author's entire political theory, as well as theory of the state, however, his more fascinating  
contribution to the political (and in many ways legal) theory represents his essay Political 
Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (ger. Politische Theologie: Vier 
Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität).22 If we use the opinions of well – known interpreters 
of Schmitt's whole work (especially Hass Hoffman), it seems right to say that Schmitt's work 
can not be viewed as an entirely built system of legal and political categories, but as an order 
of different, yet close attempts of giving answers to the questions of legitimacy and legality, 
the concept of the political and state sovereignty. 
 
The concept of sovereignty is a key concept in the philosophyof Carl Schmitt, due to the fact 
that by the concept of sovereignty (eng. sovereignty, ger. Souveränität) Schmitt confronts the 
concept of standard normative law (the kind of law we know today in criminal, misdemeanor, 
constitutional and international law) with the concept of decisionist law, that is, law that is 
based on situations, exceptions and authority that makes a decision, not norms.
23
 Moreover, 
Schmitt thinks how all law is "situational law", and the one that is sovereign, whoever he is, 
guarantees such a situation in it's entirety. For Schmitt, normative law confronts 
insurmountable barriers and limitations when it tries to distance itself from the exceptions and 
limitations, and wants to specify them as clearly as possible. Schmitt believes that the 
tendency of the entire liberal constitutionalism is to regulate all the exceptions with a clear 
specification, so that it can be made clear in which cases the law suspends itself. Schmitt's 
objection to this tendency is that the entire focus is on the norm, that is "normal" condition, 
which is defined and guaranteed by Constitution. According to Schmitt, the exception is much 
more interesting than the norm and the rule, for it is the exception that confirms the norm and 
the rule in it's entirety. Also, in the Political Theology essay, Schmitt confronts rationalist – 
based law (that is close to liberal constitutionalism) and natural law, and shows how these two 
currents work in the modern theory of state and law. Rationalist – based law is not interested, 
at least within scientific study, of possible exceptions, while natural law is – because this type 
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 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, George Schwab (trans.), 1985 
by Massachusetts Institute of Technology. First edition was published in March, 1922.  
23
 The theory of decisionist law, which was represented by Schmitt, is opposed to dominant theories of 
normative law of that time, which were represented by numerous lawyers and legal scholars of Weimar Republic, 
most notably Hans Kelsen.  
14 
of law, according to Schmitt, emanates
24
 from a different source of ideas. When Schmitt's 
views are paraphrased, one can conclude the following – rationalist – based and normative 
law comes from the Enlightenment tradition of mind/reason, while the natural law comes 
from the concept of the divine, that is – God. Schmitt boldly claims that all relevant modern 
theories of state are secularized theological concepts, and the exception within law and legal 
order is analogous to a miracle in theology. This theory is similar to ideas of Max Weber, and 
the sociology of religion, where Weber claims that the root principals of capitalism are 
already present in the religious ways of Protestantism.  
 
This leads towards the definition of sovereignty. Schmitt begins his Political Theology with a 
seductively formulated definition – "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception."25 For 
better understanding of this brief definition, it first needs to be clarified what the exception is. 
In this understanding, a helpful insight comes from George Schwab, a respected modern 
interpreter and translator of the works of Carl Schmitt in the USA, who says the following 
about the problem of the exception: "In the context of Schmitt's work, a state of exception 
includes any kind of severe economic or political disturbance that requires the application of 
extraordinary measures. Whereas an exception presupposes a constitutional order that 
provides guidelines on how to confront crises in order to reestablish order and stability, a state 
of emergency need not have an existing order as a reference point because necessitas non 
habet legem
26
".
27
 Schmitt sees his definition of sovereignty as the only one that can be applied 
to a borderline concept. In this case, the borderline concept is not something vague, but 
something that deals with the most external sphere, that is, sphere where exceptions can arise. 
State of exception is the state which makes questiong and defining sovereignty particularly 
important. For Schmitt, every legal order, as any order in general, rests upon an executive 
decision, instead of norms. It is precisely because of the fact that we can not foresee what kind 
of exception will arise within state's legal order, a clearly defined sovereignty of the 
governing body/individual is needed as a highest point, and very opposite of that is, by 
Schmitt, problematic tendency of identifying the state with the legal order. Political Theology 
essay is important in a legal – political tradition not because of precise legal – political 
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 It is not a random choice of words. As stated in the original: "…natural law tendency, which is interested in 
the emergency and emanates from an essentially different set of ideas." (italics were subsequently added by me) 
25
 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, p 5 
26
 (lat.) necessitas non habet legem – (eng.) Necessity has no law. 
27
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solutions, but because of balanced and detailed historical overview of the history of 
sovereignty. 
 
Schmitt himself claims how his legal – political findings are directly inspired by philosophical 
postulates and writings of Jean Bodin
28
, one of leading experts of international law of the late 
Middle – Ages and early Renaissance in Europe, and his concept of sovereignty, which is 
derived from the final disunion of Europe in nation states and from the perspective of 
absolutist rulers in conflict with the nobility. Aendt also perceives Bodin as an authority on 
the question of sovereignty.
29
 Bodin's thoughts on sovereignty are presented in the book Six 
Books of the Commonwealth
30
, and his thoughts are significant for his stand on sovereign 
ruler being responsible only to God, especially during the time of political crisis. Bodin's 
work was made as a reaction on the slaughter of St. Bartholomew's Day massacre, from the 
year 1572. Such a stand correlates with Niccolo Machiavelli's notion of sovereign ruler. 
However, the difference between Machiavelli and Bodin is present, for Machiavelli believes 
that the ruler may conduct free of moral justification. Bodin's argument of the sovereign ruler 
is of theological nature, because the government and sovereignty is by nature divine, and 
Machiavelli distances theology from the government. After Bodin, Schmitt continues with a 
later historical notion of sovereignty, which was formulated in the 18th century by Swiss 
jurist Emer de Vattel.
31
 Eventually, Schmitt comments on the French Revolution and the 
notions of Jean Jacques Rousseau, and his romantic notion of sovereignty – a notion that is 
particularly criticized among political scientists and political theorists, as well as Hannah 
Arendt. Arendt states in the second volume of her work The Origins of Totalitarianism – 
"Political romanticism is accused of creating a theory of race. We might accuse it of many 
other irresponsible theories. Adam Miller and Friedrich Schlegel are symptomatic for the 
general toying of modern though in which nearly any theory can temporarily take root. (...) 
The world needs to be romanticized, as Novalis had said, wishing to give the high sense to the 
ordinary, mysterious sense to everyday, dignity of the unkown..."
32
 On similar notions 
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Schmitt also warns when he states that, in the 18th century, the consistency of exclusive 
scientistic way of thinking had permeated the political ideas, which consequently repressed 
the juristic – ethical thought which was active in the time of Enlightenment. The general will 
that Rousseau spoke of, had become identical with the will of sovereign, and in the concept of 
generality, the people had become sovereign. Through that, the decisionist and personalistic 
concept of sovereignty was lost. This is closely related to Schmitt's political theology – 
regardless of not judging the metamorphosis of sovereignty as good or bad, Schmitt states 
how it is necessary to be aware that all important political concepts are extracted from 
theological premises. Also, from those premises, Schmitt criticizes the normativist and 
positivist legal theories of his contemporaries, especially that of Hans Kelsen. The key terms 
of Schmitt's essay Political Theology  are still historical sovereignty and the sovereign. 
 
However, Schmitt's secures his theoretical position, and yet he does not mention the 
relationship between the sovereign of the state, and the political subjects, that is, citizens of 
the state. As a sort of a corrective here stands Hannah Arendt, who unlike Schmitt, precisely 
arguments the complex relationship of sovereign states and political subjects/individuals in a 
very "exceptional" legal – political situation. In the Origins of Totalitarianism, precisely in 
the second tome under the title Imperialism, Hannah Arendt through a convincing historical 
and contemporary approach dissects the forms of imperialism, and the overall Europan 
political situation near the end of 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century. According to 
Hannah Arendt, the crucial events of the First World War (1914 – 1918), and the turbulent 
post – war period brought to the light of day all of problems, contradictions, and dangers of 
terms such as sovereignty and state sovereign, of which Carl Schmitt also writes about. 
Arendt ties the problem of sovereignty directly with what she calls "apories" of human rights, 
that came about near the end of the 18th century. Arendt is surprisingly close to Schmitt's 
understanding of sovereignty in the divison between sovereignty of God and sovereignty of 
Man. Arendt states how through the entire 19th century human rights were proclaimed as 
inaliable, as they came directly from the sovereignty and "maturity" of Man, not God. 
Logically, the approval of calling on human rights whenever a man (as an individual or a 
group) would be threatened by sovereignty of state was present. Also, very close to the 
decisionist stand of Schmitt – Arendt as the main problem in the history of human rights sees 
the inability of appeal to any kind of authority, that is, the lack of divine, rulers, or even 
institutional authorities when we speak of human rights. No one guaranteed the rights of man, 
except for Man himself. Also, the entire concept of human rights had become permeated with 
17 
the question of sovereignty of the people – it seemed that only the emancipated sovereignty of 
a people can truly secure such rights. By the beginning of the 20th century, in the legal – 
political sphere the expression minority has for the first time arisen as a political expression.
33
 
Just then, at the end of First World War, to the light of the day comes out the dark side of an 
absolute state sovereignty, when the repatriation of numerous refugees came into play. The 
time and the place of this occurence is the post – war WW1 period, when a large number of 
denationalized people and minorities have come about.
34
 A huge number of refugees and 
banished minorities came about from the breakdown of the old monarchy states, and faced the 
fate of the statelesness (ger. Heimatlosen, fr. apatride), a person without any citizenship. The 
most problematic groups of the stateless were post – war refugees, who were banished by 
revolutions and war, and after that, they were denationalized by the victorious governments, 
leaving them in the empty teritorry of statelesness. She states how this record – breaking 
assurgence of stateless people includes millions of Russians, hundreds of thousands of 
Armenians, thousands of Hungarians, Spanish, and many others. It it obvious that Arendt is, 
unlike Schmitt, more interested in specific socio – political events and fates of the people, 
instead of the history of political concepts and ideas. As for the important factor of 
sovereignty, Arendt sees the state sovereignty (in the specific context of post - WW1 period) 
as a highly problematic and crucial factor in the rise of totalitarian regimes in the early 20th 
century, as well as a factor that determined the fates of a large number of minority refugees 
and their communities (political subjects) without citizenship. That is very clear from the 
following quote: "Theoretically, in the sphere of international law, it was always valid that 
sovereignty is the most absolute in the things of emigration, naturalization, nationality and 
exile; in reality though, national sovereignities were holding back the practical thinking and 
silent acknowledgement of common interest until totalitarian regimes had arisen."
35
 
Sovereignty, and especially people's sovereignty, may be understood in many ways, and 
according to Arendt, the greatest fallacy of great number of nationally frustrated population 
was identifying true freedom, emancipation and people's sovereignty with a full national 
emancipation, as if the people without their own government were without their human rights 
(which is closely related to permeated concepts of human rights, authority, and the people, 
which are mentioned above).  
                                                 
33
 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p 280, Feministička izdavačka kuća, Belgrade, 1998 
34
 Above all, Arendt states that the important factor in this chaos was the breakdown of the large monarchy states 
– such as the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and Austria – Hungary, which left a large number of their 
minority citizens without a citizenship. 
35
 Hannah Arendt, op. cit., p 285 
18 
Arendt's final political analysis of the chaotic situation of minorities, stateless and 
repatriations is clearly visible from the following quote – "Full national sovereignty was 
possible only while the community of European nations existed: for it was the spirit of 
unorganized solidarity and agreement that stopped every government of using it's full 
sovereign power."
36
 The most important expression here is "full sovereign power", and it 
gives the problematics of sovereignty a new dimension, and this is never mentioned by Carl 
Schmitt. The fact is that Schmitt's analysis is turned towards the history of philosophy, theory 
of law, occasionaly to philology, while Arendt's approach is that of a historian and a political 
scientist.
37
 In Political Theology, Schmitt sees sovereignty in a legal – regulative sense, while 
Arendt's focus is on real political and legal consequences that the full state sovereignty had on 
political subjects after the First World War. Arendt also states the fact that the sovereignties 
of states may be "in conflict" during the peace time as well, and more will be explored on that 
matter in the next chapter. In brief, in his writings Schmitt keeps himself in the "safe" 
theoretical zone of the theory of sovereignty and history of law, while Arendt deals with 
political theory and sociology, as well as the consequences of political theories and 
understandings of sovereignty. If we want to articulate Arendt's conclusions and findings 
about the nature of sovereignty, then we are faced with the following notions: 
1) sovereignty is not always completely possible, 2) full state sovereignty may lead to 
disasterous and life – threatening consequences for political subjects, that is, citizens, 3) full 
emancipation of a people and people's government does not guarantee sovereignty.  
In his key essay, Political Theology and Concept of the Political, Schmitt ignores and does 
not mention the possible "real – world" consequences of state sovereignty on an individual. 
When faced with the dichotomy of individual vs state, Schmitt obviously gives a silent, yet 
great advantage to the state and the authority instance that is "higher" from an individual or a 
group. From what is stated above, it may be observed that the pluriverse of sovereign states 
from Schmitt's essay The Concept of the Political has similarities to Arendt's analysis of 
sovereignty, however, one of key differences is Arendt's detection of conflicting sovereignties 
even during the time of peace, which leads us away from the usual distinction of war and 
peace. From the perspective of sovereignty and the possibility of conflict among political 
communities, clearest conclusions can be drawn regarding implications on legal political 
subjects, in Arendt and Schmitt's respective philosophies. 
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4. Human Being as a Being of Conflict vs Human Being as a Being of Action 
 
The era of Weimar Republic, during which Schmitt wrote most of his essays, is also an age of 
great increase in the significance of anthropology, on a scientific, as well as university level, 
most of all in German – speaking areas of Europe. Some of the most well – known 
anthropologists of that time are Helmut Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, Max Scheler, and numerous 
other intellectuals. Later, in the post – war period of the fifties and the sixties, anthropology is 
on the rise again, and during that time, Hannah Arendt deals with it, most notably in her work 
Vita Activa. One should also mention how Arendt always stressed that her anthropology is, 
above all, political anthropology. That is one of the common factors that the philosophies of 
Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt have. Carl Schmitt near the end of his essay The Concept of 
the Political discusses the questions and the importance of anthropology in political thinking, 
that is, the necessity of every anthropology being a political anthropology. This is backed by 
the following passage: "Helmut Plessner, who as the first modern philosopher in his book 
Macht und menschilche Natur dared to advance a political anthropology of a grand style, 
correctly says that there exists no philosophy and no anthropology which is not politically 
relevant, just as there is no philosophically irrelevant politics. He has recognized in particular 
that philosophy and anthropology, as specifically applicable to the totality of knowledge, 
cannot, like any specialized discipline, be neutralized against irrational life decisions."
38
 
Through most of his work, Schmitt keeps his distance when it comes to proclaiming a human 
being good or evil "by nature", however, when quoting Plessner's anthropology, he notices 
how all true political theories observe a man as an "evil", problematic and dynamic being. For 
Schmitt, such political theories are the theories of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Bossuet, Fichte, and 
even Hegel.
39
 Schmitt's final stand on the "nature" of man in the political sphere can be seen 
from the following passage: "Because the sphere of the political is in the final analysis 
determined by the real possibility of enmity, political conceptions and ideas cannot very well 
start with an anthropological optimism. This would dissolve the possibility of enmity, and 
thereby, every specific political consequence."
40
 Morevoer, Schmitt's knowing of theology 
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and Roman Catholicism is tied to these claims, and he implies ties between authentic political 
theories and theological dogmas of the Original sin, similar as in his essay Political Theology. 
Schmitt can not escape the generalization on the choice between "optimism" and "pessimism", 
that is, on the question of "good" and "evil" in nature of human beings – in anthropological 
argumentation of his essay The Concept of the Political he clearly states how in "good" world, 
among "good" people, there is always peace, security and balance, and that is, according to 
Schmitt, the world in which theologians, priests, politicians and statesmen are redundant. 
There is also the matter of Schmitt's admiration to "pessimistic" political theory of Thomas 
Hobbes, who he calls "a great and systematic political thinker", who has, alongside Jean 
Bodin, undoubtedly made a crucial impact on Schmitt.
41
 Even the quick reading of Hobbes 
reveals how his seeing of man is not optimistic. The well – known quotes "Man is wolf to 
man" or "Continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short"
42
 speak for themselves. 
 
In her political anthropology, Arendt successfully keeps her distance from defining the 
tendency of man towards "good" and "evil", even when she writes about the "banality of evil" 
and radical evil of totalitarian regimes in her later works. According to Arendt, man is 
determined to live with Others, and he is determined for action, which is even more 
fundamental than generic moral categories of "good" and "evil". Moreover, Arendt's opinion 
of Hobbes is symptomatically different than Schmitt's – in the work Origins of 
Totalitarianism, Arendt is highly critical of the philosophy of Hobbes. That is illustrated in 
the following passage – "Leviathan of Hobbes has presented the only political theory where 
the state is not based on some kind of constituing law, divine law, natural law, or social 
contract which determines what is right and what is wrong in the interests of the individuals 
with respect to public affairs, and is solely based on private interests, so the private interest is 
the same thing as the public interest. (...) The main quality of Hobbes' image of a man is not a 
realistic pessimism for which he is being praised lately. For if it was true that man is a being 
from the vision of Hobbes, he would not be able to form any kind of state community."
43
 
Arendt believes that the state of Hobbes is based on the legitimacy of rule, not law. The 
expression "rule of law" does not apply to political philosophy and state of Thomas Hobbes. 
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The state gains it's monopoly on killing (this does not differentiate it from, i.e. Greek polis), 
and in return it gives a guarantee that the individual will not be killed. The consequence of 
that is, Arendt states, the blind obedience and frightening new conditions of rule. We can 
assume that the philosophy of Hobbes is statism in it's perhaps most extreme form. Statism of 
Hobbes (consequentially, same goes for the statism of Schmitt) is derived directly from the 
fear of death, that is, from fear of physical murder. Physical murder is the consequence of the 
inevitable (Hobbes's) conflict and eternal war of everyone against everyone else. According to 
Hobbes and Schmitt, human being is a political being precisely because he is a being of 
conflict. According to Arendt, human being is the being of conflict precisely because he is, 
above all, a political being. Arendt's term of action also includes conflicts with Others, while 
conflict observed from the tradition of Hobbes and Schmitt presents a mere inevitability in co 
– existence with Others, the inevitability for which a man creates the state and the laws. 
 
 As stated above, Arendt thinks that in the case of Hobbes and his state community, there is 
no "rule of law", but simply bureaucratic dominance of the state, which is welcome, precisely 
because it is inevitable. In her work Vita Activa, Arendt introduces new terms into political 
anthropology, terms such as "forgiving", "promise", and "birth" as legitimate theoretical 
aspects of human action. "The miracle which saves the world, area of human things, from his 
normal, "natural" doom, is the fact of birth, in which the capability to act is onthologically 
rooted. That is, in other words, the birth of new people and new beginning, the action they are 
capable of because they were born."
44
 With the exception of The Origins of Totalitarianism, 
Arendt does not place great emphasis on the act of physical murder in political and legal 
sphere. Schmitt observes the phenomena of killing in philosophy in a different manner, and 
associates the term of physical killing directly to the concept of enemy. As he states in The 
Concept of the Political – "For to the enemy concept belongs the ever present possibility of 
combat. (...) War is armed combat between organized political entities; civil war is armed 
combat within an organized unit. A self – laceration endangers the survival of the later. The 
essence of a weapon is that it is a means of physically killing human beings. Just as the term 
enemy, the word combat, too, is to be understood in its original existential sense. It does not 
mean competition, nor does it mean pure intellectual controversy nor symbolic wrestlings in 
which, after all, ever human being is somehow alwas involved in, for it is a fact that the entire 
life of a human being is a struggle and every human being symbolically a combatant. The 
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friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to 
the real possibility of physical killing."
45
 Schmitt stresses the exact terminology when it 
comes to political philosophy – it could be said that he belongs to a tradition of a military 
theorist Carl von Clausewitz. From one viewpoint, it might seem that Schmitt is nothing more 
than a careful realist who wants to precisely distinguish the expressions of war and peace time 
politics. As he states in The Concept of the Political – "War is neither the aim nor the purpose 
nor even the very content of politics. But as an ever present possiblity it is the leading 
presupposition which determines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and 
thereby creates a specifically political behavior."
46
 Still, Schmitt's further standpoints of the 
concept of the political and categories of friends and enemies need to be examined. In many 
of Schmitt's works, and most notably in The Concept of the Political, Schmitt deals with the 
legitimacy of the category of political. For Schmitt, the determining point of the political is in 
the fact that the conflict among people is always possible. In other words, we are dealing 
"politically" when we have the opportunity to side as friends or enemies with/against other 
people, on an international, regional or individual level. Schmitt's legitimacy of the political is 
in the eternal possibility of enmity, conflict and physical murder among people. Togetherness 
and pluralism are always conditioned by the possibility of conflict. For Arendt, things are 
somewhat different. In the philosophy of Hannah Arendt, conflicts, enmity and the possibility 
of physical murder come from the fact that people are always together, and action of any kind 
is unthinkable outside of a togetherness. For Arendt, conflict is conditioned by togetherness, 
because togetherness is a necessary condition for all political action. In her work Vita Activa, 
she states the following: - "All human activities are conditioned by the fact that people live 
together, but only action can not be envisioned outside of a society of people. (...) Action is an 
exclusive privilege of man; nor god nor animal are capable of action, only action is 
completely dependant on the constant presence of others.  This special relation between action 
and togetherness seems to fully justify the earlier translation of Aristotle's zoon politikon with 
animal socialis that is found already in Seneca, and it becomes the usual translation with 
Thomas Aquinas: homo est naturaliter politicus, id est, socialis ("man is by nature political, 
therefore social")."
47
 Arendt's political philosophy starts with togetherness of people, which is 
a prerequisite for any other happening of political or legal nature. In his essays, Schmitt 
implicitly takes togetherness for granted, which is conditioned by conflict and the possibility 
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of war. It should be noted how Schmitt has a tendency to generalize and to give wide 
definitions, while Arendt's terminology and definitions are more exact in terms of political 
science. In his essence, Schmitt is more than a careful realist who wants to separate 
expressions of war and peace, though his meticulous historical analysis of political and legal 
concepts remains excellent. Schmitt's philosophy contains a subtle anti – liberal attitude, that 
is perhaps most radical in his essay State, Movement, People, in which he tries to justify first 
NSDAP sweeps of political opposition. 
However, his anti – liberal tendencies are older than the era of Third Reich, they date back to 
the year 1926, when the first edition of his essay Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy 
appeared. This essay clearly shows Schmitt's standpoints and opinions on liberalism, 
parliamentarism, and democracy. In this essay, Schmitt deals with what he sees as the general 
perception of parliamentarism and liberalism in the beginning of the 20th century, in the year 
1926. Schmitt states the following in the foreword to the first edition of the essay - "...it will 
be shown that the systematic basis from which modern parliamentarism developed is scarcely 
discernible in the terms of current political and social thought, and how far the institution 
itself has lost its moral and intellectual foundations and only remains standing through sheer 
mechanical perservance as an empty apparatus. Only when they grasp the situation 
intellectually could reform proposals gain perspective. Concepts such as democracy, 
liberalism, individualism and rationalism, all of which are used in connection with modern 
parliament, must be more clearly distinguished so that they cease to be provisional 
characterizations and slogans."
48
 It is not completely clear on what Schmitt refers to when he 
speaks of "current political and social thought", but given the fact that the essay was 
published for the first time in 1926, it is plausible that Schmitt refers to federative 
Constitution of Weimar Republic of pre – Nazi period, as well as the politics of president Paul 
von Hindenburg. Still, Schmitt's legitimate philosophical aim certainly is understanding and 
differentiating between concepts, and the essay (as many other, including The Concept of the 
Political and Political Theology) is based on a meticulous and exact legal and historical 
analysis of political and legal concepts. In this case, such concepts are democracy and 
parliamentarism. Schmitt's basic understanding of democracy is quite different from the 
understanding of his philosophical and jurist contemporaries, such as Hans Kelsen, Hermann 
Heller and Carl Schmid. Schmitt's understanding of democracy is also different from 
conservative and skeptic attitudes towards democracy, the attitudes that Edmund Burke and 
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Alexis de Tocqueville presented during the 18th and the 19th century. The following passage 
illustrates Schmitt's understanding of democracy – "If all political tendencies could make use 
of democracy, then this proved that it had no political content and was only an organizational 
form; and if one regarded it from the perspective of some political program that one hoped to 
achieve with the help of democracy, then one had to ask oneself what value democracy itself 
had merely as a form. (...) The various nations or social and economic groups who organize 
themselves "democratically" have the same subject, the people, only in abstract. In concreto 
the masses are sociologically and psychologically heterogenous. A democracy can be 
militarist or pacifist, absolutist or liberal, centralized or decentralized, progressive or 
reactionary and again different at different time without ceasing to be a democracy."
49
  
 
Schmitt believes that democracy is, in early 20th century, mostly powerless against the 
Jacobin argument, that is, against the identification of a certain loud minority with the entire 
people and the problematic of "education" of citizens so they would be able to choose a good 
government for themselves. Schmitt's opinion of liberalism is both provocative and original. 
For Schmitt, liberalism is more than just a philosophy of economy or social system with the 
basis on liberties of individual. Schmitt thinks that liberalism is a consistent and overall 
metaphysical system. Basic principles of liberalism, like freedom of speech, freedom of press, 
freedom to gather and market competition are not just purposeful instruments of social order, 
but the core of liberalism as an overall metaphysical system. Economic and market 
competition of liberalism are equal to eternal competition of thought, which is a specific 
standpoint towards the problem of truth in the philosophy of liberalism. In the essay The 
Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy Schmitt analyses one of key aspects of liberalism – the 
public opinion and freedom of the press. As is the case with Political Theology and Concept 
of the Political, this is an analysis which is historical and terminological, while exact political 
events and statistics are not the subject of Schmitt's research. When he reviews the history of 
the freedom of press, Schmitt sees a distorted image which, in time, had become self – 
explanatory and as such, taken for granted. Schmitt states that, in reality, public opinion is less 
important than the publicity of the opinion. Moreover, the claim for the public opinion, which 
has, according to Schmitt, arisen from the theory of state secrets, Arcana rei publicae, which 
was present in numerous writings of the legal – political history of the 16th and the 17th 
century.
50
 The theory of Arcana rei publicae was conceived in the writings of Niccolo 
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Machiavelli, and it belongs to a way of thinking that views politics only as a technique of 
gaining as spreading the domain of authority. The claim for the public opinion was conceived 
in the counter – Machiavellian literature, which perceived such theories as "immoral". In the 
claim for the public opinion, we actually deal with juxtaposed terms of law and justice, and 
Machiavellian technique of power and rule is being adjusted by legal framework and moral 
ethos. Because of that, Schmitt believes how in the 20th century, political theory has come to 
that it views the public as an absolute and inviolable value, and the importance that is given to 
her is misplaced, for it is nothing else than a practical means of combat agains the secret 
bureaucratic policies behind closed doors. Politics that is being run by a few people beyond 
the reach of public is now perceived as something that is bad per se, and the public is turning 
into an absolutely efficient control body, efficient against every political plot and corruption. 
It remains open to interpretation how correct Schmitt's analysis is. However, Arendt's analysis 
of the nature of public and totalitarian movements in Origins of Totalitarianism is close to 
Schmitt's stand – as Arendt calls the totalitarian movements "the secret societies founded in 
broad daylight".
51
 Arendt agrees with Schmitt how symptomatic and contradictory the nature 
of public opinion was during the beginning of the 20th century, especially after WW1 and 
during the rise of totalitarianism. The existence of a unified world of mass and public had 
given the totalitarian regimes the sweeping power, reach, and mass support. In other words, 
totalitarian state may be viewed as a state in which absolutely everything is public, where 
citizens are one public individual who has no contact with the private sphere of civic life. 
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5. State of Exception and Action 
 
The term "action" which Arendt believes to be very importat is not completely foreign to 
Schmitt. In the essay Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Schmitt gives a review of a 
particular schism within the history of legal action, and he deals with this topic in the essay 
Political Theology, as well. Schmitt, believes that, ever since Aristotle, there has been an 
opposition between the general, correct norm, and the order, which is "real". Schmitt says that 
this is the characteristic of every legal and political action, as he states the following – "Law, 
Veritas in contrast to mere Autoritas, the generally correct norm in contract to the merely real 
and concrete order as Zitelmann argued in a brilliant formulation, as an imperative always 
contains an individual nontransferable moment; this idea of law has always been conceived as 
something intellectual, unlike the executive, which is essentially active. Legislation is 
deliberare, executive agere."
52
 On the other hand, Arendt is not trying to associate the act of 
action with a legal context. Schmitt always discusses action within a legal framework, as legal 
action, that is, action within a legal state context. There is no doubt however, that Schmitt 
perceives action as a political term as well, but a priori he places it into a state context, and 
every state presumes institutional, legal and normative framework. For Arendt, ability of 
action presumes some form of community, but she never states that this community must be a 
state, or an elaborate legal system. The question at hand is, how much action is legal, and how 
much a political term. For Schmitt, action is more of a legal (and juristic) term, and less 
political. However, in his analysis Schmitt discusses a legal contamination of political terms 
through the attempt of defining the state of exception. The problem of the exception and the 
state of exception within legal and political area is not a new occurence, as Walter Benjamin 
has also explored this problem, and in more recent times, contemporary Italian philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben. In her works, Hannah Arendt does not mention the state of exception 
expression in her works, however, it can be assumed that by state of exception she understood 
revolutions, which she discusses in her work On Revolution.
53
 The expression of state of 
exception is important for better understanding of Schmitt, but also, for better understanding 
of Arendt. State of exception is a common denominator for Schmitt and Arendt – for it is a 
"place" where the philosophies of two philosophers are in collision and are overlapping. 
Namely, the state of exception, which Schmitt discusses, always presumes an action of some 
type, which Arendt discusses. In state of exception, to light come about the political and legal 
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identity of a human being, and those two identities sometimes may be mutually exclusive. 
Within the state of exception, one deals with a contest of legal and political action, and of the 
decision about which type of action comes first. Human being as a legal subject, or human 
being as a political subject? Are there situations when it is justified to give priority to the 
political aspect, instead of legal? Is it also the other way around in some situations? It is 
certain that in every society and every country there are states of emergency and various 
exceptions when power of the law does not apply anymore, and sovereign bodies (whatever or 
whoever they may be) are not capable of bringing forth the adequate decision or a regulation. 
Often these states presume civil wars, revolutions, armed riots, rebellions, etc. In his analysis 
of the legal – political character of the state of exception, in his eponymous book State of 
Exception, Giorgio Agamben writes the following passages: "The problem of the state of 
exception shows the obvious analogies with the problem of the right to resist. It has been 
much discussed, especially at constitution assemblies, of the possibility of introducing the 
right to resist in a text of constitution (...) In any case, it is sure that, if the resistance would 
become a right, or even duty (and non – compliance with this duty might be punishable), not 
only would the constitution become the absolute inviolable value, but also the political 
choices of the citizens would become legally regulated. It is the fact that, with the right to 
resist, and with the state of exception, the question is the problem of ascribing the legal 
meaning to an area, that is beyond law."
54
 Agamben states how not until the 20th and 21st 
century, there was an attempt of introducing the state of exception within a legal context and a 
constitution. However, state of exception has it's history. The origin of the state of exception 
is found in a modern state is found in France, during the time of Revolution from year 1789. 
Also, one of the more contemporary political phenomena is the identification of political – 
military and economic state of exception. However, the question of wether or not are such 
states true or false states of exception and emergency remains, as well as the question of what 
is the relation of legal – political subjects to the state of exception. There is a tendency of 
introducing the state of exception and emergency in the constitutions of modern states. When 
discussing this constitutional problem, it is very important to keep in mind the constitutional 
properties of the totalitarian regimes of Nazi Germany and Bolshevist Soviet Union, as well 
as other more contemporary dictatorships. On this particular phenomena, in Origins of 
Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt states the following: "The fact how totalitarian regimes 
handle the constitutional question is even more disturbing. In their first years of power, Nazis 
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have made an avalanche of laws and directives, but they did not even try to officially abolish 
the Constitution of Weimar Republic, and even left the public services more or less intact – 
the fact that made many local bystanders believe in the limitation of party's influence and a 
quick normalization of the new regime. (...) Soviet Union, which had it's public services 
destroyed during the revolution and in which the regime barely even considered the law 
during the revolutionary period, had taken an effort to publish a new and a very detailed 
constitution in 1936 (a mere front made up of liberal phrases and principles which shrouded 
the guillotine on the frontline), the event which was celebrated, in Russia and worldwide, as a 
crown of the revolutionary period."
55
 Totalitarian regimes insist on simulating democracies 
and constitutional freedoms, until the abolishment of those very freedoms. Once again, 
Schmitt enters the arena of the discussion, with his analysis of authoritarian moments of every 
constitution and every democracy. Also, Schmitt agrees with Arendt in diagnosis that the 
existence of a constitution within  a state does not mean the absence of dictatorship. It could 
be said that Schmitt focuses on study of constitutional authoritarianism. As he puts it in The 
Concept of the Political – "For in a "constitutional state" is, as said by Lorenz von Stein, a 
constituion is an "expression of a social order, the existence of the civic society. As soon as it 
is under attack, the fight must be decided outside of system and law, that is through armed 
force."
56
 The proclamation of war seems an adequate response to endangering of the 
constitution, at least it is so according to Schmitt and his writings. There is an undoubtable 
connection between  the state of exception and the dictatorship. One of the main historical 
problems and a something of a constitutional and legal phenomenon is the Article 48 of the 
Weimar Constitution of that time – the article whose misuse prepared the grounds for Adolf 
Hitler's takeover. A proper understanding of the connection between the state of exception 
and the dictatorship, as well as Article 48 is introduced by Agamben, in his work State of 
Exception – "The history of Article 48 of the Weimar Republic is so tightly woven into the 
history of Germany between the wars that it is impossible to understand Hitler's rise to power 
without first analyzing the uses and abuses of this article in the years between 1919 and 1933. 
It's immediate precedent was Article 68 of the Bismarckian Constitution, which, in cases 
where "public security was threatened in the territory of the Reich", granted the emperor the 
power to declare a part of the Reich to be in a state of war (Kriegzustand), whose conditions 
and limitations followed those set forth in the Prussian law of June 4, 1851, concerning the 
state of siege. Amid the disorder and rioting that followed the end of the war, the deputies of 
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the National Assembly that was to vote on the new constitution (assisted by jurists among 
whom the name of Hugo Preuss stands out) included an article that granted the president of 
the Reich extremely broad emergency powers. Save for a relative pause between 1925 and 
1929, the governments of the Republic, beginning with Bruning's, made continual use of 
Article 48, proclaiming a state of exception and issuing emergency decrees on more than two 
hundred and fifty occasions; among other things, they employed it to imprison thousands of 
communist militants and to set up tribunals authorized to pronounce capital sentences. (...) It 
is well known that the last years of the Weimar Republic passed entirely under a regime of the 
state of exception; it is less obvious to note that Hitler could probably not have taken power 
had the country not been under a regime of presidential dictatorship for nearly three years and 
had parliament been functioning."
57
 The final Agamben's remark is a key to understanding the 
true practice of Schmitt's anti – liberal sentiment and statism. During his extensive theorizing 
in Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy and The Concept of the Political, Schmitt, in his usual 
way, renounces all "real – world" practice and specific cases in which parliament and liberal 
policies of the public were abolished. Nowhere in the mentioned writings does Schmitt pay 
attention to the true political and legal practice of his theories, nor historical theories and 
writings that he uses as his basis. However, Schmitt has in the first edition of his Political 
Theology back in 1922, as a brilliant jurist, stressed the dangers and contradictions of the 
Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. Schmitt emphasizes the problematic federative 
structure of Weimar Republic, and he asks a question are the autonomous regions/states
58
 in 
the Weimar Republic of that period truly autonomous, in the real sense of the word. That is, 
do they posses the autonomy to resist the proclamation of the state of exception, proclaimed 
by the president or the supreme chancellor. In the essay Political Theology he clearly states 
how the Article 48 in itself represents unlimited power – " According to article 48 of the 
German constitution of 1919, the exception is declared by the president of the Reich but is 
under the control of the parliament, the Reichstag, which can at any time demand its 
suspension. This provision corresponds to the development and practice of the liberal 
constitutional state, which attempts to repress the question of sovereignty by a division and 
mutual control competences. But only the arrangement of the precondition that governs the 
invocation of exception powers corresponds to the liberal constitutional tendency, not the 
content of article 48. Article 48 grants unlimited power. If applied without check, it would 
grant exceptional powers in the same way as article 14 of the [French] Charter of 1815., 
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which made the monarch sovereign. If the individual states no longer have the power to 
declare the exception, as the prevailing opinion on article 48 contends, then they no longer 
enjoy the status of states. Article 48 is the actual reference point for answering the question 
whether the individual German states are states."
59
 Schmitt clearly defined the constitutional 
problem, even though it remains questionable how much of his critique of leading social and 
political directions, and this critique is undoubtedly pointed at Weimar parliament, has 
influenced the skepticism and gradual distrust of parliamentary values of the time. Also, in his 
writings, Schmitt also speaks about democracy as a political form which could have been used 
by all political directions (including socialism) of the 19th century during their breakthrough, 
but he never defines the content of democracy itself. It can be interpreted, according to 
Schmitt, that democracy by itself does not have any political content, and that it is simply a 
form of organization that as it's subject has the people. In other words, democracy is a mass 
form of organization and divison of political rights, without a real content. Parliament and 
parliamentarism are key concepts of political pluralism and political action. Etimologically, 
the word parliament has it's roots in the 14th century – as a noun, the word originally means 
consultation, assembly. In it's verb form, the word comes from French language and the verb 
parler – "to speak", "to address". In his analyses, Schmitt sees the concepts of parliament and 
parliamentarism as something that is opposed to force, as a discussion and a debate which are 
are a counterweight to the force. Schmitt believes that through parliamentarism, the principle 
of "la discussion substitutée à la force" [the discussion substitutes the force]60 thrives. In a 
more recent, English variant, parley means "to speak with the enemy". According to Schmitt, 
it seems that Parliamentarism is something routine – like and impersonal, and something that 
does not fulfill the purpose it had in the political system of the 19th century – and even then 
only as a response to secret cabinet policies of the 17th and the 18th century. In the time of a 
political crisis, and maybe also a state of exception, it seems that the parliament does not have 
any functions, because the balance of opinions and public argumentation does not have 
anything to do with real freedoms and can not endanger true holders of power. Schmitt's 
cynicism and anti – liberalism are obvious at the end of the essay Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy – "Real life of parliament made of political parties, as well as the general belief, 
are today far from such a belief. Great political and economical decisions on which the fate of 
people rest are not (if they ever were) the result of balancing of opinions in public speech and 
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counter- speech and are not a result of parliamentary debate. (...) It is certain that today there 
are not many people who would want to renounce old liberal freedoms, especially freedom of 
speech and freedom of press. Despite that, in the European continent, there are not many of 
those who believe that those freedoms truly exist there where they could jeopardize the true 
holders of power."
61
 It is not my intent to question how true is Schmitt's historical analysis of 
parliamentarism. Fact is that the form of parliamentarism and parliament that we know today 
has emerged in the 18th century. However, Schmitt degrades the problem of parliament and 
parliamentarism when he views it as a pure technical matter. In his essay Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy he states that "parliamentarism abandons it's spiritual basis..." 
without going into question of what this spiritual basis really is. For Schmitt, congresses, 
parliaments and gatherings are merely historically induced technical means for combat against 
cabinet secrets of the 16th and the 17th century. It is highly problematic to understand any 
political phenomenon only in technical terms. Arguments that can be aimed at Schmitt's views 
are numerous, and it is perhaps best to use practical examples. Practical response to Schmitt 
regarding the parliament's role in politically exceptional states is certainly the case of Weimar 
Republic from the year 1933, however, one can also use the case of Czech parliament from 
the year 1993, during the time of "Velvet Divorce"
62
 and the breakdown of Czechoslovakia. 
Intense negotations between Czech and Slovak parliamentary groups were held from July up 
to November 1992, during which the constitutional law and the right of sovereignty of both 
nations were re – evalued. The confirmation of separate and independent sovereignties was 
established in the Article 542, and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was completed on 
December 31, 1992. The Czech president at that time and ex – dissident Vaclav Havel had 
resigned before his term ended, because he did not approve of the seperation. However, with 
his political action and numerous speeches, he is a legitimate source and presents a valid 
counter – argumentation to Schmitt's arguments. In his speech The Post – Communist 
Nightmare, on the topic of historical phenomena, Havel states the following: "Anyone who 
understands a given historical phenomenon merely as an inconvenience will ultimately see 
many other things that way too: the warnings of ecologists, public opinion, the vagaries of 
voters, public morality. It is an easy, and therefore seductive, way of seeing the world and 
history. But it is extremely dangerous because we tend to remain aloof from things that 
inconvenience us and get in our way, just as some of my acquaintances avoided me during the 
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Communist era. Any position based on the feeling that the world, or history, is merely an 
accumulation of inconveniences inevitably leads to a turning away from reality, and 
ultimately, to resigning oneself to it. It leads to appeasement, even to collaboration."
63
 
Regardless of the attitudes towards parliaments, it is a fact that the parliament is a historical 
and political phenomenon, that can not be taken lightly. Parliamentarism is not an a priori 
marking of a political pluralism, because in reality, parliament can also be made of a single 
party. However, parliament is not a mere "technique of rule without proper content and 
function", or a mere technical matter. When speaking of pluralism, one should bear in mind 
that it is a social, as much as it is a political phenomenon. In Hannah Arendt's philosophy, 
political and social are separate categories, regardless of the fact that these expressions are 
often taken as one and the same thing. Arendt considered that public life and political 
relations are not something natural, but artificial, completely man made. She considered it to 
be a unique human accomplishment. Political pluralism is possible in the world which is 
shared by people in togetherness, which is also a technical term in Arendt's philosophy. She 
elaborates on her viewpoints in Vita Activa – "Under the conditions of a common world, 
reality is not guaranteed primarily by the "common nature" of all men who constitute it, but 
rather by the fact that, differences of position and the resulting variety of perspectives 
notwithstanding, everybody is always concerned with the same object. If the sameness of the 
object can no longer be discerned, no common nature of men, least of all the natural 
conformism of a mass society, can prevent the destruction of the common world, which is 
usually preceded by the destruction of the many aspects in which it presents itself to human 
plurality. This can happen under conditions of radical isolation, where nobody can any longer 
agree with anybody else, as is usually the case in tyrannies. (...) In both instances, men have 
become entirely private, that is, they have been deprived of seeing and hearing others, of 
being seen and being heard by them."
64
 This presents another counterpoint to Schmitt's 
critique of the public and it's discourse. While Schmitt sees the public factor of politics 
through technical – historical approach, Arendt places the public at the very core of her 
anthropological political system. According to Arendt, politics and political life have not 
become a public matter through historical development of parliamentarism, they are that way 
because they are human and man made in origin.  
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6. Definition of a Legal – Political Subject Within Context of Didactic and 
Pedagogy 
 
Definition of man as a legal – political subject in international politics has it's application in 
didactic, that is, in a school period in interaction with students. Given that every theory has it's 
practice, and every practice has it's theory, pedagogic practice is highly important in the field 
of political education of children and youth. The word "political education" might seem 
disturbing and contradictory to some, but in this context, I understand political education as 
an integral part of civic education and/or ethics. In this context, political education should be 
the education of the possibilites of choices, as well as opening the possibilites for a creative 
student's discussion. Given the recent rise of importance of subjects such as civic education 
and ethics, it is important to consider the lecturing implications of this political concept. Idea 
of a man as a legal – political subject can be presented to students within the subjects of 
philosophy, politics and economy, ethics and civic education. The idea of a man as a citizen 
(that is, legal – political subject) is an important part of philosophy's curriculum, due to the 
fact that many philosophers (alongside Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt) dealt with the 
human being and his fundamental legal – political determination. The attempt to define 
human being as a legal – political subject is present in the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, 
Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant and many other philosophers, who are an integral part of every high 
school textbook of philosophy and ethics. Correlation with other subjects is also possbile, 
especially with history and sociology, especially if the violations of human and civil rights in 
historical context are discussed in class. A school period with this topic is possible in high 
school, as well as the university. It is important to note that the given topic requires a certain 
foreknowledge of history of philosophy, and the ideal timing for this kind of class/period 
would be at the end of a semester, when the students are versed in basic political terminology 
and categories. Through studying human being as a legal – political subject, the students will 
gain insight into historical, problematic and philosophical approach towards this philosophical 
phenomena. 
 
The period may begin with a technique of "brainstorming", thus encouraging the students on a 
creative game of associations. A central phrase may be i.e. a phrase by Thomas Hobbes 
"Homo homini lupus". Students may have five minutes to think about associations (also 
possible through work in pairs), and after that the teacher writes down the key assocations on 
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the blackboard. It is probable that the students will first think of associations from Greek 
political philosophy, or some contemporary assocation from the present times. Expected 
associations are, for example: "law", "military", "courts/tribunal", "parliament", "president", 
"weapons", "danger", etc. As a brief repetition the concepts and expressions such as 
democracy, parliament or law can be explained further through student questioning or 
teacher's explaining. At the blackboard, associations may look like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the next five minutes, a brief discussion can take place, followed by the student's 
impressions of the current state of affairs in their country's politics, do they feel safe as the 
inhabitants and citizens of Republic of Croatia. Teacher can try to focus the discussion 
towards a dilemma – is living in Croatia safe due to togetherness with their friends and fellow 
 
 
 
HOMO HOMINI EST LUPUS. 
 
THE LAW 
 
MILITARY 
 
COURTS  
WEAPONS 
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citizens, or due to the fact that the Republic of Croatia (or any other country which they are 
citizens of) is a state which is governed by the rule of law, with it's constitution, courts and 
other institutions. After that, teacher directs the students to the most prominent philosophers 
who were dealing with human being as a citizen or a legal – political subject, as well as the 
differences in their opinions. 
 
PHILOSOPHER CITIZEN/STATE 
Plato Politeia, 3 classes, citizens are 
philosophers/rulers, guardians and 
manufacturers 
Aristotle Greek polis, citizens have various trades and 
professions, and the status of citizens is 
meant only for some. 
Hobbes Constitutional authoritarian state, the war of 
all against all, citizen is a lupus/a wolf and an 
immediate danger for every other citizen. 
Kant Constitutional state, world alliance of 
republics, every citizen must respect the 
freedom of every other citizen. 
 
After that, the main part of the class begins, and it should last about thirty minutes. If the 
circumstances are favorable, the main part of the class may be backed up with a Power Point 
presentation, although it is not necessary. The main part of teaching is of frontal type, 
although it includes many opportunites for debate and work in pairs. Main part of the class 
begins with explanations of main philosophical concepts of Thomas Hobbes – bellum omnium 
contra omnes, man is wolf to man, natural condition, state, sovereign ruler, constitution. It is 
desirable to ask students for their impressions on the philosophy of Hobbes – is Hobbes a 
realist, a pessimist, does he favors the dictatorship, etc.? Going from there, students are 
directed towards the philosophy of Carl Schmitt, and his relationship with totalitarian Nazi 
Germany. Comparison with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant – categorical imperative, 
cosmopolitism, perpetual peace. It is also desirable to ask students for their opinion on Kant 
from today's perspective – is Kant a utopist, does the categorical imperative make sense, is 
perpetual peace among nations possible? Philosophy of Immanuel Kant leads to philosophy of 
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Hannah Arendt, and her most important philosophical contributions. When explaining Arendt 
to students, a central concept should be the concept of togetherness. The lecturing part may 
last between fifteen and twenty minutes. After that, teacher asks the students a question – "Is 
there truly a war of all against everyone else among people, or is togetherness more important, 
and does it precede every conflict?" With this question it is possible to start a brief discussion, 
i.e. in the following way – during the period of ten minutes, students are to be directed to 
writing down their brief review and stand on the dilemma at hand. This can also be an 
opportunity for some creative work in pairs. After the students are done, discuss their 
viewpoints and direct them to individual thinking of everyday political events and phenomena 
that are shown in the media – such as, political refugees from foreign regimes, constitutional 
crises, civil wars, initiatives for constitutional and political changes, etc. Final five to ten 
minutes may be used for suggesting topics for essays and critical reviews. Possible topics 
include: "Man and Law, Past and Today", "Individual in Totalitarianism", "Perfect 
Constitution", "Man is a Wolf to a Man", as well as other topics suggested by students. It is 
desirable to direct students to additional sources that mention human being as a legal – 
political subject, and the list of those sources includes authors such as Leo Strauss, Giorgio 
Agamben, Walter Benjamin, Raymond Aron, Thomas Hobbes, Jean Bodin, Niccolo 
Machiavelli, and of course, numerous works of Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt. 
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7. Final Considerations and Closing Words 
 
In the world of politics, international law and social philosophy, human being's status as a 
legal – political status has a tendency to change. This status can not be something permanent 
and unchangeable, precisely because of states of exception and unexpected changes that can 
always take place in the sphere of politics. Human political life is conditioned by changes and 
conditions that can not be predicted. In modern society, citizens expect security and protection 
from the state, especially if there is a democratic regime in power. This type of citizens' 
attitude is fully understandable, for a solid and secure state and civil rights are still the most 
firm guarantee of physical survival and protection. Regardless of the increased strength of 
international law, especially in Europe, nation state is still a crucial factor in the individual's 
protection and the protection of his status. On this matter, Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt 
are in agreement – the importance of nation state in the modern world is unquestionable. 
However, political paradigm by which this relation between the state and the individual is 
realized is different in their respective philosophies. Their definition of the concept of 
political is different, and every definition in political and legal theory has it's implications, 
consequences and influences. From Schmitt's point of view, there is a concept of political that 
is built on notions of friendship and enmity. From Arendt's point of view, there is a concept of 
the political that is built on the inevitable pluralism and togetherness. The concept of 
togetherness and plurality comes before concepts of friendship and enmity. That means that 
before political subjects can successfully side as friends and enemies, one needs plurality, 
some sort of togetherness. Paradox of Schmitt's theory is that one man can not be both friend 
and enemy to himself at the same time, especially in exclusive and strict political terminology, 
on which Schmitt himself insists on. To be your own's friend and enemy at the same time 
might be valid in psychological interpretation, but certainly not in political interpretation. To 
create any kind of friendship or enmity among people, plurality is needed. This is precisely 
the crucial point in Hannah Arendt's theory – people inherit the Earth, not a man in singularity. 
Arendt's definition of politics can be summed in the way that politics is everything we do in 
togetherness.  
 
Radical consequences of Schmitt's friendship and enmity are numerous – one of them is the 
legitimacy of any kind of conquering politics of the Third Reich. Moreover, Schmitt's theory 
of political leaves plenty of room for any kind of politics of conquest, as well as the politics of 
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segregation within a single state, as was the case of i.e. Apartheid and politics of South Africa 
in the 20th century. Arendt's political theory can be considered more egalitarian, regardless of 
the fact that is applicable in the same way as Schmitt's. Arendt's theory of political should not 
be considered simply more humanitarian, but more precise in determination of the concept of 
political. Schmitt's theory of friendship and enmity, along with statism and importance of 
state are close to ideas of Hobbes, and ideas of Hobbes are known to stand that from the worst 
possible evil, physical murder and torture, we can protect ourselves by the other form of evil, 
which is state itself. When constructing his theory of state, Schmitt is, much like Hobbes, 
focused on fear from immediate physical killing, something that is close to consideration that, 
as a political form, the state is conditioned by something that comes from the outside, in this 
case - threat of war, torture and murder. With Arendt, the order of things is inversed. Man 
creates the state and his public space with humans equal to himself, precisely because man is 
conditioned to live forever among others. Schmitt's definition of the state of exception is valid 
today as well (Agamben agrees with Schmitt's diagnosis), however, every state of exception 
includes action of some type. Schmitt's concept of action is different that the concept of action 
in Arendt's philosophy. Schmitt does not insist on separation of action and legal context. For 
Arendt on the other hand, authentic action is a pure political act, something that does not a 
priori include a legal order (after all, action may be constitutional to a legal order, state, 
institution, etc).  
 
Problems stated above are more abstract in nature and do not have much influence on citizens 
as legal – political subjects. However, the problem of bare survival is created precisely when 
one takes a look at the state sovereignty issue. Schmitt's analysis of sovereign government 
never takes into consideration any consequence on citizens, that is, legal – political subjects of 
some legal order or state. Schmitt is satisfied with a historical and legal analysis of the 
concept of sovereignty, as well as theological implications of this concept. Arendt's analysis 
of sovereign power is more exact and more real, examplified by the post – WW1 chaotic 
period. In her Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt uses the expression which Schmitt never 
considered, which is full sovereign power. For examples of full sovereign power she lists the 
actions of Bolshevik Russia, Hungary, Spain, and many other European states after the year 
1918. Although the loss of citizenship is not necessarily a jeopardization of a person's 
physical survival, the loss of citizenship is equal to the loss of legitimate legal – political 
subject in the eyes of international law. In the 21st century, situation is not so hopeless as it 
was, due to the existence of UN, Geneva Conventions, Council of Europe and other 
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international and legal bodies. However, even today the loss of citizenship is something that is 
very close to the possible jeopardization of human rights and physical survival, because this 
places people on a highly uncertain territory, where none of the bodies of the state can 
guarantee their safety. In this paradox lies one of the most significant dangers and 
inconsistencies of Schmitt's theory – from one side, a powerful state is present to guarantee 
safety of it's citizens. According to Schmitt, the state must have a sovereign ruler or at least a 
fully sovereign government. However, full sovereign power of a state is evident also in the 
ability to remove citizenship from it's citizens, even in mass numbers, which can be seen from 
the examples given by Hannah Arendt. Modern constitutions are usually clearly defined on 
issues of gaining citizenship, however, they are quite vague regarding the loss of citizenship, 
and the most frequent reasons for such  a loss are listed as "dismissals", renunciations" and 
"international treaties" due to which a person can lose it's citizenship.
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 Also, the only article 
of the constitution of Republic of Croatia which mentions the revocation of citizenship is 
article 9, which states the following – "Croatian citizenship, and its acquisition and revocation, 
shall be regulated by law. A citizen of the Republic of Croatia may not be forcibly exiled 
from the Republic of Croatia nor deprived of citizenship, nor extradited to another state, 
except in case of execution of a decision on extradition or surrender made in compliance with 
international treaty or the acquis communautaire of the European Union."
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When circumstances of war and various emergency states are taken into account, it is obvious 
that the loss of citizenship depends on political and legal situation in a state, that is, on a given 
"situation". It is precisely because of these unspecified and ill – defined circumstances under 
which the loss of citizenship can occur, Schmitt's theory of sovereign as the one who decides 
on the exception remains insufficient. If the emergency states, such as wars, economy crises 
and acts of terrorism are inevitable and always possible, isn't there a need for a more precise 
definition of sovereign and sovereignty? Hannah Arendt has correctly noted that the largest 
state of exception is the problem of legal status of a citizen of a state, as well as the question 
of who can take that status away from them arbitrarily. Full sovereign power of a government 
in certain situations is capable of doing so. Because of that, it is necessary to see sovereignty 
within a context which takes human beings and their status into account, before the state or 
any other type of entity. It is there that Hannah Arendt takes over with her thinking of 
political action as togetherness and pluralism, instead of primitive seeing of friendship and 
enmity, on a human, as well as an international level. 
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 Such provisions are stated in the Law on Croatian Citizenship, from the year 1993. 
66
 The Constitution of Republic of Croatia (consolidated text) 
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